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READYING VIRGINIA FOR REDISTRICTING AFTER A
DECADE OF ELECTION LAW UPHEAVAL
Henry L. Chambers, Jr. *
INTRODUCTION
Until Virginians approved Constitutional Amendment 1 in November 2020, the Virginia Constitution required the General Assembly redraw Virginia’s state legislative and congressional electoral districts every ten years in the wake of the national census.1
Redistricting culminated in the adoption of legislation redefining
those districts.2 If the redistricting process had worked as intended
after the 2010 census, electoral districts would have been redrawn
and adopted by the General Assembly in 2011, approved by the
Governor, and used for the ensuing decade.3 The redistricting process did not work as the Virginia Constitution contemplated. The
General Assembly redrew, and the Governor approved, state Senate and House of Delegates districts in 2011.4 The state Senate districts remained substantially unchanged during the 2010s. Conversely, pursuant to litigation, a court-appointed special master

* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks Joleen
Traynor and Zanas Talley for their research assistance.
1. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6; Rachel Weiner, Virginians Approve Turning Redistricting
Over to Bipartisan Commission, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/local/virginia-politics/virginia-redistricting-amendment-results/2020/11/02/5d1ef24219f8-11eb-befb-8864259bd2d8_story.html [https://perma.cc/A4VM-FNAE].
2. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-302.2 (congressional districts), -303.3 (state Senate districts), -304.03 (House of Delegates districts) (Repl. Vol. 2016 & Cum. Supp. 2020).
3. See VA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (“The General Assembly shall reapportion the Commonwealth into electoral districts in accordance with this section in the year 2011 and every ten
years thereafter.”).
4. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 795 (2017); BethuneHill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 522 (E.D. Va. 2015).
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redrew many of the House of Delegates districts the General Assembly had drawn in 2011.5 The current House of Delegates districts were finally fully implemented in 2019.6 The General Assembly redrew, and the Governor approved, Virginia’s congressional
districts in 2012, one year after the Virginia Constitution mandated.7 Pursuant to litigation, a court-appointed special master redrew multiple districts in that plan.8 The current congressional
districts were finally fully implemented in 2016.9
The chaos surrounding the post-2010 census redistricting process has led to uncertainty regarding the post-2020 census redistricting process. The last redistricting process helped trigger a constitutional amendment that gives primary redistricting responsibility to a newly created Virginia Redistricting Commission
(“VRC”).10 The Virginia Constitution now requires the VRC redraw
electoral districts in the wake of the 2020 census, approve the districts by supermajority, and submit them to the General Assembly.
The General Assembly must enact the VRC’s redistricted maps
without changes before the new districts can be used.11 The Supreme Court of Virginia would draw the districts if the VRC could
not agree on maps to submit to the General Assembly or if the General Assembly declined to approve the VRC’s maps.12 The Governor
of Virginia no longer has any role in redistricting.13
Post-2020 census redistricting is uncertain because the substantive law of redistricting has changed over the last decade. The laws
that governed redistricting a decade ago—the Virginia Constitution, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and the Federal
Voting Rights Act—will govern redistricting in 2021. However, significant legal developments in the last decade have changed and
clarified the doctrine regarding those enactments. For example,
5. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 368 F. Supp. 3d 872, 873–74 (E.D.
Va. 2019) (discussing Dr. Bernard Grofman’s work drawing maps as a special master for
House of Delegates redistricting).
6. Id. at 874.
7. See Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73514,
at *11 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015).
8. Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 556 (E.D. Va. 2016) (adopting Dr.
Bernard Grofman’s maps drawn as special master for congressional redistricting).
9. Id. at 565 (ordering use of the plan proposed by the special master).
10. See Act of Apr. 10, 2020, ch. 1071, 2020 Va. Acts __, __.
11. S.J. Res. 18, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2020) (proposed amendment to VA.
CONST. art. II, § 6-A(a), (d)–(e)).
12. Id. (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(f)–(g)).
13. See id.
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the Supreme Court of the United States deemed part of the Voting
Rights Act unconstitutional, releasing Virginia from compliance
with the Act’s preclearance requirement to which Virginia had
been subject for over fifty years.14 Preclearance required certain
jurisdictions to ask permission from the United States Department
of Justice (“DOJ”) or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia before using new election laws or making voting
changes, such as using new redistricting maps to ensure those
changes did not harm the rights of minority voters.15 That change
may significantly alter how race is considered in redistricting.
Whatever entity redraws the Commonwealth’s electoral districts
in 2021 will need to comply with fewer rules than the General Assembly did a decade ago, but that may not make redistricting easier.
The General Assembly was aware of the complexity surrounding
2021 redistricting and used its 2020 session to prepare. It passed
legislation directing how electoral districts are to be redrawn and
approved and sent the aforementioned constitutional amendment
to voters for approval. The new legislation is sensible and addresses some issues of partisanship and race in redistricting but
does not fully address the changes in the law of redistricting over
the last decade that might affect the substance of the upcoming
redistricting. The General Assembly may use its 2021 session to
address lingering issues. However, it should have considered and
resolved those issues in 2020. Addressing lingering issues in the
2021 session, as the redistricting process begins, may be deemed
contrary to an attempt to eliminate politics from the redistricting
process.
This Essay considers the changes in redistricting law that have
occurred since Virginia redrew its electoral districts after the 2010
census, what those changes might mean for Virginia’s redistricting
in 2021, and how the General Assembly did and did not address
those changes in its 2020 session. Part I discusses the legal regime
in place for redistricting after the 2010 census. Part II notes how
the General Assembly redistricted after the 2010 census. Part III
explains how the law of redistricting has changed since Virginia
last redistricted. Part IV analyzes how the General Assembly used

14.
15.

See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
52 U.S.C. § 10304 (section 5 of the Voting Rights Act).
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its 2020 session to prepare for redistricting in 2021, noting the issues it addressed and those it did not address.
I. LEGAL REGIME FOR REDISTRICTING POST-2010 CENSUS
In Virginia, districting—the process of dividing a jurisdiction
into geographical areas to provide those areas common representation16—was both simple and complex in 2011.17 The process encompasses three separate tasks—redistricting the House of Delegates, the state Senate, and Virginia’s congressional delegation—
with each task raising slightly different issues.18 The state and federal requirements the General Assembly was required to navigate
when redistricting in 2011 are overlapping and interconnected.
The Virginia Constitution requires electoral districts be contiguous, compact, and of roughly equal population.19 The U.S. Constitution and federal law similarly require electoral districts be of
roughly equal population.20 They also restrict the use of race when
redistricting, but implicitly require consciousness of race so that
minority-race voters can elect their representatives of choice to the
same extent other voters can.21 These components created a complex web of rules for mapmakers to navigate in 2011. Drawing districts with roughly equal population is simple; drawing coherent,
equipopulous districts that adhere to the additional legal requirements for districting is complex.22

16. Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Enclave Districting, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 135, 137
(1999) (“Districting is the process of grouping things—be they pieces of land or collections
of people—in order to provide the group with common representation.”).
17. Though a legislature can be elected at-large and districts need not be geographybased, the Virginia Constitution requires the General Assembly and Virginia’s congressional representation be apportioned in geography-based electoral districts. VA. CONST. art.
II, § 6 (“Members of the House of Representatives of the United States and members of the
Senate and of the House of Delegates of the General Assembly shall be elected from electoral
districts established by the General Assembly.”).
18. Federal statutory law, not the U.S. Constitution, requires congressional districting.
See 2 U.S.C. § 2c (requiring the creation of congressional districts).
19. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6.
20. See discussion infra sections I.B, III.B (describing requirements of the One PersonOne Vote doctrine).
21. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301.
22. Drawing districts that match the purposes of districting can be even more difficult.
For a discussion of justifications for districting, see generally Chambers, supra note 16.
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A. Contiguity and Compactness
The Virginia Constitution requires electoral districts be contiguous and compact.23 Contiguousness and compactness are related
but serve somewhat different purposes.24 Contiguousness requires
all parts of a district be physically connected.25 Compactness requires a district not be spread too far apart.26 The requirements
may appear to constrain mapmakers significantly, but they do not.
The requirements suggest districts should be of standard shape,
as square or circular as practicable, rather than like jigsaw puzzle
pieces. However, Virginia law did not in 2011, and does not today,
require standard-looking districts. It required districts that were
contiguous by land or water and that met a minimal subjective
standard of compactness. Mapmakers were not significantly constrained by the contiguousness and compactness requirements in
2011.
The lack of constraint on mapmakers stemmed from both how
Virginia law assesses the constitutionality of statutes and the law’s
substantive standards for contiguousness and compactness. Post2010 census redistricting produced standard legislation that defined election districts.27 Virginia law presumes statutes are constitutional,28 with statutes deemed constitutional unless they are
clearly repugnant to the Virginia Constitution.29 If the General Assembly believed it drew compact and contiguous electoral districts,
the districts were to be deemed constitutional unless the General
23. VA. CONST. art. II, § 6 (“Every electoral district shall be composed of contiguous and
compact territory . . . .”).
24. Chambers, supra note 16, at 159 (“[C]ompactness and contiguousness are related,
but are not the same. Nonetheless, contiguousness and compactness are rarely analyzed
separately, and compactness tends to subsume contiguousness.”).
25. See Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447, 463–64, 571 S.E.2d 100, 109–10 (2002) (discussing
the standard for contiguity).
26. Chambers, supra note 16, at 158 (“Compactness is a relative concept that focuses
on the shape of a district and considers whether districting lines could be made more uniform or whether a district could be of a more regular shape.”).
27. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-302.2 (Repl. Vol. 2016) (providing for the creation of
Virginia’s congressional districts).
28. See, e.g., Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va. 506, 509–10, 423 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1992)
(“[W]e also note the ‘strong presumption of validity’ attached to every statute and the requirement that it ‘clearly’ violate some constitutional provision before courts will invalidate
it.” (quoting Caldwell v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 238 Va. 148, 152, 380 S.E.2d 910, 912 (1989))).
29. E.g., Wilkins, 264 Va. at 462, 571 S.E.2d at 108; Jamerson, 244 Va. at 509, 423
S.E.2d at 182 (“Legislative determinations of fact upon which the constitutionality of a statute may depend bind the courts unless clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted.”).
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Assembly’s position was not “fairly debatable.”30 A mapmaker
must merely make an effort to comply with the legal standard for
contiguousness and compactness for its districts to be deemed constitutionally acceptable.
In addition, the legal standards for contiguousness and compactness are low. Contiguousness requires each part of a district be accessible to all other parts of a district and is met when a person can
reach every point in a district without crossing into another district.31 A district will be deemed per se noncontiguous only when
two parts of the district are completely separated by land.32 When
parts of a district are separated by water, the district may be contiguous even if the most practical way to get from one part of the
district to another requires using a bridge that traverses a different district.33 Under those circumstances, a court may find a district is contiguous if the use of other traditional redistricting factors—for example, preserving existing districts or communities of
interest—justifies the district’s shape.34
The compactness standard is easier to meet than is apparent because a district need not be as compact as possible to be deemed
“compact.”35 Virginia’s unique geography—including its eastern
shore and its oddly shaped subdivisions (such as Henrico
County)—guarantees that drawing maximally compact districts
will conflict with other districting criteria, such as the desire to
keep political subdivisions intact.36 Nonetheless, even when a mapmaker is not constrained by such factors, the mapmaker need not
attempt to draw highly compact districts. A minimal standard of
30. See Wilkins, 264 Va. at 462, 571 S.E.2d at 108; Jamerson, 244 Va. at 509–10, 423
S.E.2d at 182.
31. For a general discussion of the contiguity requirement, see Wilkins, 264 Va. at 463–
64, 571 S.E.2d at 109.
32. Id. at 464, 571 S.E.2d at 109 (“Short of an intervening land mass totally severing
two sections of an electoral district, there is no per se test for the constitutional requirement
of contiguity.”).
33. See, e.g., id. at 465–66, 571 S.E.2d at 110 (discussing a district parts of which were
separated by water with the only driving access between them being over a bridge that
connected one part of the district with a different district).
34. See id. at 464, 571 S.E.2d at 109 (including “preservation of existing districts, incumbency, voting behavior, and communities of interest” as considerations that may have
affected how a district was drawn and can affect whether the district will be deemed contiguous).
35. See Jamerson, 244 Va. at 517, 423 S.E.2d at 186 (noting certain Virginia state Senate districts were not as compact as they could be but were still constitutionally compact).
36. See id. at 512, 423 S.E.2d at 183 (noting Virginia redistricting policy considerations,
including a desire to avoid splitting jurisdictions when districting).
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compactness appears met if the mapmaker has good reasons for
drawing the districts based on a combination of legitimate districting criteria.37 For example, the southside Virginia state Senate districts deemed compact in Jamerson v. Womack38 were 145 and 165
miles long, were relatively narrow, and ran parallel to one another.39 The population in the two districts could have been divided
into two very different and more geographically compact districts.
Nonetheless, the districts were deemed compact.40
A compact district’s relative compactness can matter. Compactness is a traditional districting principle.41 The less compact a district is, the more likely a court may find an unacceptable, nontraditional districting principle has helped create the district. If a
nontraditional districting principle predominates over traditional
districting principles, the district may be deemed unlawful in some
circumstances.42
In Virginia in 2011, compactness was a spatial and geographical
requirement untethered to whether the population inside a district
comprised a “community of interest.”43 Though one could argue
contiguousness and compactness are required because they help
ensure a district is internally cohesive, districts need not be internally cohesive to be deemed contiguous and compact.44 If a district
37. See Wilkins, 264 Va. at 463, 571 S.E.2d at 108 (“[I]f the validity of the legislature’s
reconciliation of various criteria is fairly debatable and not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or
wholly unwarranted, neither the court below nor this Court can conclude that the resulting
electoral district fails to comply with the compactness and contiguous [sic] requirements of
Article II, § 6.”); Jamerson, 244 Va. at 517, 423 S.E.2d at 186 (“The territories of Districts
15 and 18 are not ideal in terms of compactness. Nevertheless, we must give proper deference to the wide discretion accorded the General Assembly in its value judgment of the relative degree of compactness required when reconciling the multiple concerns of apportionment.”).
38. 244 Va. at 517, 423 S.E.2d at 186.
39. Id. at 509, 423 S.E.2d at 181.
40. Id. at 517, 423 S.E.2d at 186.
41. See Chambers, supra note 16, at 158.
42. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993).
43. Jamerson, 224 Va. at 514, 23 S.E.2d at 184 (deeming the contiguity and compactness inquiries to revolve solely around spatial considerations). For a discussion of how Virginia’s criteria for redistricting in 2021 define and consider “communities of interest,” see
infra section IV.A.5.
44. Compactness should be related to communities of interest and the idea that the
population of a district has similar concerns. If a district’s population does not comprise a
community of interest, it is not clear why it should have shared representation. The assumption is that the closer a district’s residents live to one another, the more likely they share a
community of interest. See Chambers, supra note 16, at 163 (“The most important feature
of compact districting is that it validates the notion that those who live close to each other
should have common representation.”).
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was visually compact in 2011, whether it encompassed a community of interest did not appear to matter. However, if a district appeared noncompact, a mapmaker’s attempt to create a community
of interest in the district using other traditional districting criteria
could help convince a court the district was compact.
B. One Person-One Vote and Equipopulous Districts
The U.S. and Virginia Constitutions require electoral districts
contain roughly equal populations. The Virginia Constitution’s explicit requirement of equal representation for equal populations
leads directly to the requirement of equipopulous districts.45 The
U.S. Constitution indirectly requires nearly equipopulous districts
through its One Person-One Vote (“OPOV”) jurisprudence. The
OPOV doctrine stems from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause. The assertion of a right to an equally weighted
vote was initially deemed by the Supreme Court to involve a nonjusticiable political question.46 Litigants persisted, arguing Voter
A and Voter B are treated unequally if Voter A’s vote has more
power to elect a representative than does Voter B’s.47 Eventually,
the Court ruled the claim to an equally weighted vote is an Equal
Protection issue that involves political rights rather than a political question, and ruled the matter justiciable.48 The Court then
ruled the Equal Protection Clause guarantees a right to an equally
weighted vote.49 The requirement of an equally weighted vote is
operationalized by requiring districts of relatively equal population.50 Though districts with the same population can have different numbers of voters, arguably triggering an OPOV violation, the
Court has ruled OPOV is fairly realized through equipopulous districts rather than districts with equal numbers of voters.51

45. VA. CONST. art. II., § 6 (“Every electoral district . . . shall be so constituted as to
give, as nearly as is practicable, representation in proportion to the population of the district.”).
46. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 558 (1946).
47. See Chambers, supra note 16, at 138 (“At its core, the one-person, one-vote doctrine
established that all citizens have an equal right to choose their political representatives,
advance their political interests, and influence government.”).
48. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
49. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964).
50. Id. at 579.
51. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1132 (2016) (rejecting the argument that
districts must contain equal numbers of voters rather than equal population).
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States have argued that one of their state legislative houses
should not be required to have equipopulous districts, just as the
U.S. Senate is not subject to the OPOV doctrine.52 Those arguments have been rejected.53 Constitutional text explicitly structures the U.S. Senate, exempting it from the OPOV doctrine.54 Unevenly apportioned districts in a state legislative body violate the
Equal Protection Clause and are unconstitutional.
Electoral districts need only be roughly equipopulous. They
must contain populations that are as close to equal as practicable.55
For congressional districts, only slight deviations from equality are
allowed.56 Much larger deviations are allowed for state legislative
districts.57 The nature of state legislatures and legislative business
suggests that allowing state legislative districts to follow political
subdivisions and other redistricting criteria—even when that leads
to nonequipopulous districts—is more important in that context
than in the congressional context. State legislative districting
plans that have a maximum overall deviation of greater than ten
percent from perfect equality have been deemed constitutional.58
State legislative districting plans cannot contain a maximum deviation of ten percent by right, but ten percent is a standard. When
the maximum deviation is below ten percent, constitutionality can
be presumed, with the plaintiff required to prove the deviation is
unnecessary or motivated by an improper purpose.59

52. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 571–74 (discussing the analogy between Alabama
Senate structure and U.S. Senate structure set out in an Alabama redistricting plan).
53. Id. at 568 (holding that, when apportioned, all state legislative bodies must be apportioned into districts with roughly equal populations).
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1 (providing equal representation by state rather than by
population).
55. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 743–45 (1973) (noting absolutely equal
population is not required).
56. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 98 (1997); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725,
730 (1983) (holding population deviations in congressional districts must not be able to be
eliminated by a good-faith effort to draw districts of equal population and must be necessary
to achieve legitimate state objectives).
57. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 318–19, 321 (1973) (noting that, for practical
reasons, more flexibility in satisfying the equal apportionment requirement is appropriate
for state legislative districts than for congressional districts, and upholding a Virginia redistricting plan including a maximum population variation of 16.4%).
58. See, e.g., id. Maximum deviation is calculated by adding the maximum percentage
underpopulation to the maximum percentage overpopulation. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S.
Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016).
59. See Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 947, 949–50 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (summary affirmance of a finding of unconstitutionality for a redistricting plan with a maximum
deviation under ten percent when the deviation was caused by improper political reasons).
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C. Partisan Gerrymandering
In 2011, the Supreme Court had not resolved whether redistricting for naked partisan advantage was unconstitutional, though it
had been considering the issue for twenty-five years. In Davis v.
Bandemer, the Court determined partisan gerrymandering is justiciable.60 However, the Justices could not agree about the precise
contours of the claim, and no relief was provided.61 That approach
continued in Vieth v. Jubelirer,62 where five members of the Court
deemed partisan gerrymandering cognizable, but no relief was provided.63 Justice Kennedy—one of the group of five Justices who
deemed partisan gerrymandering cognizable64—concurred in the
decision of the four-Justice plurality that deemed gerrymandering
a political question because he could not identify judicially discernible and manageable standards that would allow the claims to be
adjudicated.65 Vieth’s multiple fractured opinions suggested the
right to be free of partisan gerrymandering was a right without a
remedy.
By 2011, three ideas had emerged. First, partisan gerrymandering was inconsistent with constitutional ideals.66 Second, no agreement existed on the standards to use to determine when unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering had occurred.67 Third, a right to
be free of partisan gerrymandering did not subsume a right to proportional representation.68 What remained unclear was whether a
districting plan infected with partisan gerrymandering would ever
be invalidated on that ground.

60. 478 U.S. 109, 119 (1986).
61. See id. at 126–27, 142–43 (plurality opinion), 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring), 161–
62 (Powell, J., dissenting) (setting out competing views of the appropriate standards to use
in resolving political gerrymandering claims).
62. 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
63. See id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 326–27 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 346
(Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting), 368 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (variously asserting partisan gerrymandering claims may be justiciable under the Court’s decision in
Bandemer).
64. Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting five Justices took exception to the plurality’s position that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable).
65. Id. at 306–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 316–17.
67. The Court never found a political gerrymander it thought it could remedy. See, e.g.,
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 414, 423 (2006).
68. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131–32 (1986).
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D. Race and Redistricting
Race is the most difficult issue a mapmaker must manage when
redistricting. Redistricting must comply with the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments and the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”). The
Amendments and the VRA can take different paths toward ensuring racial equality in voting. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause requires all races be treated equally with respect
to rights, including voting rights, and suggests considerations of
race should not play a role in public policy decision-making, including redistricting.69 The Fifteenth Amendment bars the denial or
abridgment of the right to vote because of race.70 However, the history of American voting rights suggests that protecting the voting
rights of minority voters may require awareness of and the explicit
consideration of race, including when redistricting. The VRA enforces the Fifteenth Amendment and encourages equality by demanding an equal opportunity for minority voters to exercise their
voting power and to elect their representatives of choice when appropriate.71 The Fourteenth Amendment on one hand and the Fifteenth Amendment and VRA on the other combine to demand mapmakers consider race as little as possible while considering race as
much as necessary to guarantee minority voters are able to exercise their right to vote fully.72
1. Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment bars states from intentionally using race to make decisions except under limited circumstances. The
use of race tends to be subject to strict scrutiny whether race is
used affirmatively to help voters or negatively to harm them.73
69. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1410–14, 1424 (2002) (discussing the development of colorblindness doctrine under the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.”).
71. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)) (announcing the Act’s purpose as enforcing the Fifteenth
Amendment and prohibiting voting practices that discriminate on the basis of race).
72. See Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va. 506, 511, 423 S.E.2d 180, 182–83 (1992) (noting
redistricting must comply with the U.S. Constitution and sections 2 and 5 of the Voting
Rights Act).
73. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 653 (1993) (discussing the imposition of strict scrutiny for malign and benign racial classifications); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904
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However, in the redistricting context, the restriction on the use of
race is somewhat relaxed.74 Rather than bar all uses of race in redistricting, the Supreme Court deems the Equal Protection Clause
implicated when race is used as a predominant factor in redistricting.75
In Shaw v. Reno,76 a case involving white voters challenging
their placement in a majority-minority district, the Court ruled assigning voters to districts based on race—even when attempting to
provide minority-race voters fair access to political power—may violate the Fourteenth Amendment.77 The plaintiffs were required to
prove the redistricting, and their assignment into the district,
could not be explained on any grounds other than race.78 They did
so, according to the Court, by showing the district’s irregular shape
suggested traditional districting principles, such as compactness
and the preference to keep political subdivisions whole, had been
abandoned.79 The subversion of those principles supported the
claim that the districting was unexplainable on any grounds other
than race.80 Shaw triggered confusion because some believed the
Court’s decision held the strange shape of the district alone proved
the Fourteenth Amendment violation.81 The Court clarified the
doctrine in Miller v. Johnson.82
In Miller, the Court ruled the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated when mapmakers use race as a predominant factor in redistricting.83 Plaintiffs challenging the redistricting were required to
prove the use of race subordinated the use of “traditional race-neutral districting principles,” such as compactness, contiguousness,
(1995).
74. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race and Representation Revisited: The New Racial Gerrymandering Cases and Section 2 of the VRA, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1559, 1560–67 (2018) (discussing the genesis of the Supreme Court’s analysis of race
in redistricting).
75. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241–42 (2001) (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U.S. 541, 546–47 (1999)).
76. 509 U.S. 630.
77. Id. at 658.
78. Id. at 642.
79. Id. at 646–47, 649.
80. Id. (noting the use of traditional districting criteria can defeat a claim that a district
was drawn for racial reasons).
81. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912–13 (1995). This confusion may be explained
by the Shaw Court’s assertion that “reapportionment is one area in which [a district’s] appearances do matter.” Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
82. 515 U.S. at 911–15.
83. Id. at 916.
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respect for political subdivisions, and communities of interest.84
The shape of the districts was relevant to proving the subordination of other districting principles, but did not alone prove the predominant use of race.85
When race is a predominant factor in districting, its use must
survive strict scrutiny.86 The use of race must serve a compelling
state interest and be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.87
Compliance with the Voting Rights Act has been treated as a compelling state interest with the “narrow tailoring” requirement being met by the need to use race to comply with the VRA.88 That
requires knowing exactly what the VRA requires, even as the
VRA’s meaning changes over time.
2. Fifteenth Amendment
The Fifteenth Amendment bars voting restrictions based on
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.89 Laws that deny the
right to cast a ballot based on race or that limit the effectiveness of
a voter’s ballot based on race violate the Fifteenth Amendment.90
The Amendment requires intentional discrimination by the state.91
However, intent may be proven when facially race-neutral action
hides intentional discrimination. For example, the grandfather
clause—a clause basing one’s eligibility to vote on one’s grandfa-

84. Id. (“[A] plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect for
political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.”).
85. Id. at 912–13. For discussion of race predominance, see Chambers, supra note 69,
at 1454–57.
86. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 91 (1997) (“If race is the predominant motive
in creating districts, strict scrutiny applies . . . .” (citing Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959
(1996))).
87. Id. at 91.
88. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 976–77 (discussing the “narrow tailoring” requirement in the
redistricting context). Race need not be used as narrowly as possible in drawing districts to
meet the narrow tailoring prong. Id. at 977.
89. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.”).
90. See Chambers, supra note 69, at 1419–33.
91. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 223 (2009) (noting the
Fifteenth Amendment is limited to covering intentional discrimination); Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (same).
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ther’s ability to vote on a date before former slaves had been allowed to vote—was used to limit the African American vote and
was eventually deemed unconstitutional.92
The Fifteenth Amendment has also been used to stop electoral
line drawing used to abridge minority voting rights. In Gomillion
v. Lightfoot, the Supreme Court reviewed a law that redrew the
city limits of Tuskegee, Alabama to exclude nearly all Black residents from the city.93 Though the legislation was facially race neutral—it merely defined the city’s boundaries—the Court found that
if discriminatory intent supported the law, it was unconstitutional.94 Attempts to limit the voting rights of African Americans,
evidenced by cases like Gomillion, led to the passage of the Voting
Rights Act, which may require the explicit consideration of race to
guarantee the rights of minority-race voters are protected.
3. The Voting Rights Act
Passed in 1965 in the wake of the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s tepid
protection of voting rights, the Voting Rights Act enforces the Fifteenth Amendment.95 Reauthorized in 1970, 1975, 1982, and
2006,96 the VRA bars the denial or abridgment of the right to vote
on account of race or color.97 The VRA explicitly requires minority
voters be given the ability to elect representatives of their choice
consistent with democratic principles.98 Compliance with that command may require race be considered or used in redistricting.
92. See Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 276–77 (1939); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
347, 367 (1915).
93. 364 U.S. 339, 340–41 (1960).
94. Id. at 347–48.
95. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); see Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 152
(1993) (“Congress enacted § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to help effectuate the Fifteenth Amendment’s guarantee that no citizen’s right to vote shall ‘be denied or abridged
. . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude’” (citation omitted)).
96. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314; Act of
Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub.
L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131; Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting
Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat.
577.
97. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (“No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United
States to vote on account of race or color . . . .”).
98. See id. § 10301(b) (“A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election
in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a
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Sections 2 and 5 were the key provisions of the VRA with which
mapmakers needed to comply in 2011. The sections overlap but
used different standards and had different purposes. Section 2 applied—and still applies—to all jurisdictions.99 Until 2013, section
5 applied to a limited number of covered jurisdictions, including
Virginia, and required those jurisdictions to have any new voting
laws precleared or approved by the federal government before they
could be used.100 The preclearance provision was meant to guarantee the identified jurisdictions continued to move toward providing
equal voting rights to their minority voters.
a. Section 2
Section 2 of the VRA bars laws and procedures that discriminate
with respect to the right to vote on the basis of race. A law may
violate section 2 if it either intentionally abridges or denies or otherwise has the effect of abridging or denying the right to vote based
on a voter’s race.101 When minority voters cannot elect their representatives of choice to the same extent nonminority voters can elect
their representatives of choice section 2 may be violated.102 In the
context of redistricting, section 2 provides minority-race voters no
more and no less than other voters can gain through their exercise
of the right to vote in an electoral system. Some object, arguing
racial discrimination cannot exist and the VRA cannot be violated
if mapmakers draw fair districts without explicitly considering
race. However, if drawing fair districts or no districts at all—atlarge voting—has the effect of harming the ability of minority voters to elect their candidates of choice, the VRA may be violated.

class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”).
99. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003) (“For example, while § 5 is limited
to particular covered jurisdictions, § 2 applies to all States.”).
100. Jurisdictions were covered based on the formula in section 4 of the VRA. See 52
U.S.C. § 10303(b) (2012).
101. The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act broadened section 2’s scope to include a quasi-effects test in the wake of City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified
as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)); see Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986) (noting the 1982 amendments were made largely in response to the Bolden decision).
102. Some Justices do not believe section 2 should apply to redistricting. See, e.g., Holder
v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 922–23 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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The Supreme Court addressed issues related to the fairness of
voting systems in Thornburg v. Gingles.103 Gingles involved, in
part, minority-race plaintiffs challenging several multimember
districts and claiming their continued use effectively lessened their
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.104 Evaluating
the claim required the Court compare the representation minority
voters received under the multimember system to the representation they would fairly receive under a single-member district system. The comparison was tricky, as the Court needed to distinguish between the amount of representation minority voters failed
to gain because they were a numerical minority and the amount of
representation they failed to gain because they were a racial minority.
The Court created three Gingles preconditions to illuminate that
distinction. The three Gingles preconditions are: (1) the minority
voters must be sufficiently numerous to constitute a majority in a
regularly drawn single-member district, (2) the minority voters
must be politically cohesive, and (3) bloc voting must exist such
that nonminority voters can generally stop the minority voters
from electing their candidate of choice.105 If the minority voters do
not constitute a majority in a compact single-member district, they
lose because they are too geographically dispersed and not because
they are racial minorities. If the minority voters are not cohesive,
they lose because they lack the numbers to split the district’s vote
and still elect their candidate of choice and not because they are a
racial minority. If racial bloc voting does not exist or does not stop
the minority voters from electing their candidate of choice, the minority voters fail to elect their candidate of choice because they do
not build coalitions and not because they cannot build coalitions.
The Gingles preconditions have been criticized as too narrow, and
they may be.106 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court treated them as
the minimum basis for a section 2 claim.107 If the Gingles preconditions are met, the minority voters must then prove—based on a
totality of the circumstances—they have less of an opportunity to

103. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
104. Id. at 35.
105. Id. at 50–51.
106. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 199–204 (1989).
107. See, e.g., Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (discussing the Gingles factors as
threshold factors for a section 2 vote-dilution challenge).
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elect their representatives of choice than other groups.108 If the
Gingles preconditions are not met—assuming no other intentional
discrimination has been proven—there is no section 2 violation in
the context of redistricting.
The Court also applies the Gingles preconditions in cases when
districts already exist.109 When redistricting is at issue, the question is whether minority voters would have a better and fairer opportunity to elect their representatives of choice if the districts
were drawn differently. One remedy for a section 2 violation would
be to draw the majority-minority district that the Gingles preconditions prove can be drawn.
Depending on the population density and dispersion of minority
voters, mapmakers may be able to draw more majority-minority
districts than would provide proportional representation for minority voters. Mapmakers are not required to do so.110 Section 2 focuses on making sure minority voters have as much power as they
should—not necessarily more relative power than other voters. If
more majority-minority districts than are necessary to reach proportional representation arose organically, section 2 would not bar
them.111 Such districts would simply exist; they would not be a
remedy for a section 2 violation.
When redistricting, mapmakers must focus carefully on matching the potential remedy to the potential violation to avoid liability.
A legislature cannot remedy a section 2 violation in one part of a
state with a majority-minority district in a different part of the
state.112 If section 2 violations exist in both parts of the state, the
legislature may draw one majority-minority district if drawing two

108. See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 425–26 (2006) (“If all three Gingles requirements are
established, the statutory text directs us to consider the ‘totality of circumstances’ to determine whether members of a racial group have less opportunity than do other members of
the electorate.” (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011–12 (1994))).
109. See Growe, 507 U.S. at 40 (deciding Gingles should apply to single-member districts).
110. See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1016 (noting mapmakers may not be required to draw the
maximum number of majority-minority districts that can be drawn when minority voters
have proportional representation with fewer than the maximum majority-minority districts).
111. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 155–56 (1993) (suggesting states are not
prohibited from drawing majority-minority districts in the absence of a section 2 violation).
112. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 430–31.
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might “overrepresent” the minority group or if drawing two districts is not possible for other reasons.113
When remedying a section 2 violation, a mapmaker can choose
to draw a majority-minority district or a crossover district in which
a plurality of minority voters can join with a group of nonminority
voters to reliably elect the representative the minority voters prefer.114 Leaving the choice to the jurisdiction may seem odd. However, a crossover district allows minority voters to elect their representative of choice and may leave the minority voters who would
have helped make a majority-minority district free to influence a
different district or become a part of another crossover district.
That is a choice the jurisdiction should be allowed to make.
b. Section 5
Until 2013, section 5 of the VRA required specific jurisdictions,
including Virginia, to have their voting changes precleared by the
DOJ or a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia (“DDC”) before those changes became effective. Section 5 ensures equality by requiring a covered jurisdiction’s voting changes be precleared by the DDC only when the voting change at issue “neither has the purpose nor will have the
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race
or color . . . .”115 The DOJ administratively preclears the voting
change when it believes the law meets the standard the DDC is
required to apply.116 Jurisdictions covered by section 5 included
those defined by the coverage formula in section 4 of the VRA and
those covered by section 3 of the VRA due to their record of voting
rights violations.117 The preclearance process functionally required
covered jurisdictions to ask permission before applying changes to
their voting and election laws.

113. Id. at 429.
114. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009).
115. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a).
116. See Daniel P. Tokaji, If It’s Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance,
49 HOW. L.J. 785, 797 (2006) (discussing the standard for administrative preclearance).
117. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (section 5, providing jurisdictions subject to preclearance
requirements); id. § 10302(c) (section 3, permitting federal courts to subject jurisdictions
beyond those covered by section 4 to section 5 preclearance based on patterns of voting rights
violations).
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Preclearance was necessary because historical deficiencies in
the covered jurisdictions’ voting enforcement or voter registration
suggested racial minorities had not been able to exercise their right
to vote as fully as others in the covered jurisdictions.118 Practically,
preclearance forced jurisdictions to consider how their voting
changes would be viewed by the DOJ or the DDC. That alone may
have had a moderating effect on the legislation from those jurisdictions. The preclearance process ensured new laws could not lead to
the retrogression of the position of minority voters’ ability to exercise their right to vote.119 Section 5 prohibited the covered jurisdictions from backsliding on any progress they had made toward
providing equal voting rights.120
A redistricting plan cannot have “the purpose of or . . . have the
effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States
on account of race or color . . . to elect their preferred candidates of
choice . . . .”121 In the redistricting context, the preclearance inquiry
requires the comparison of the power of minority voters to elect
their preferred representatives of choice before the redistricting
plan was passed to their power to elect their representatives of
choice after the redistricting plan was passed.122 That is tricky because districting is a dynamic process, particularly when comparing new districts to old districts drawn ten years prior. Population
shifts over a decade ensure that new districts will not perfectly
match old districts geographically. Though section 5 may appear
to invite and may have led to district-versus-district retrogression
comparisons, courts often compared an entire old redistricting map
to the redistricting map that replaced it when considering retrogression.123
Population shifts could make a retrogression analysis difficult
even when comparing an entire map to another entire map. Inward
migration and outmigration can change a state’s demographics. If
a state’s percentage of minority population changes, the amount of
118. For a discussion of the original purpose and conception of preclearance, see South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315–23 (1966).
119. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 134–35 (1983) (describing section
5’s purpose as prohibiting changes to voting procedures that lead to retrogressions in the
ability of minority-race voters to exercise the right to vote); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130, 141 (1976) (same).
120. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 140–41.
121. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b).
122. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 465–66, 469 (2003).
123. Id. at 478.
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power minority voters should wield might change. If intrastate
population migration alters where minority groups live, comparisons can be difficult. In some circumstances, whether Gingles preconditions can be met in a specific part of the state can change
based on population migration. Minority voters may become too
dispersed to fit into a single-member district, or they may become
less cohesive, or bloc voting may lessen. Nonetheless, the comparison between maps separated by a decade needed to be made for
retrogression purposes.
In 2011, the Supreme Court’s approach to retrogression in the
redistricting context was unclear. In 2003, the Court decided Georgia v. Ashcroft.124 In Ashcroft, the Court decided states could meet
their section 5 non-retrogression redistricting obligations in part
by creating “influence districts.”125 In contrast to crossover and majority-minority districts, influence districts allow minority voters
to have influence over who is elected to represent a district but do
not provide a sufficiently robust minority plurality for minority
voters to elect their representatives of choice.126 Georgia argued the
set of influence districts, crossover districts, and majority-minority
districts it created under its new districting plan provided just as
much electoral power in the state legislature for minority voters as
they had under the prior map, meaning no retrogression had occurred.127 The Ashcroft Court determined section 5 required no retrogression with respect to the overall power of minority voters to
influence the political system and allowed the trial court to consider the effect of influence districts in deciding the retrogression
issue.128 Congress disagreed.
The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006
amended and reauthorized the Voting Rights Act.129 It explicitly
repudiated the Ashcroft Court’s opinion. The 2006 amendments
make clear that any voting rule (including a redistricting plan)
124. 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
125. Id. at 482.
126. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 13 (2009) (“At the other end of the spectrum are
influence districts, in which a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even
if its preferred candidate cannot be elected.”).
127. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 467–72 (discussing Georgia’s redistricting and the motivation supporting it).
128. Id. at 490–91.
129. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
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that diminishes minority voters’ ability “to elect their preferred
candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote . . . .”130
Influence districts do not allow minority voters to elect their representatives of choice, so they cannot help a jurisdiction meet its
section 5 obligation. The amendments did not indicate how crossover districts should factor into the retrogression analysis. Crossover districts do lead to the election of the minority voters’ candidates of choice, but with help from others. A court might be allowed
to compare crossover and majority-minority districts in a new plan
to the crossover and majority-minority districts in the plan that
was replaced. Conversely, a court could be limited to comparing
majority-minority districts in a new plan to the majority-minority
districts in a superseded plan to determine if a state had met its
non-retrogression obligation.
E. Summary
Mapmakers in 2011 had a difficult task. Their job was to create
compact, contiguous districts of equal population which considered
race enough to avoid violations of sections 2 or 5 of the VRA, but
considered race just enough either to avoid a finding that race predominated in drawing districts or to garner a finding that the use
of race was sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest.131 The use of race to comply with the VRA could be
a compelling state interest, but the use of race had to be narrowly
tailored to meet the scope of the compelling state interest; that is,
good reasons must have existed to believe race needed to be used
to comply with the VRA.132 In drawing districts, the mapmakers
should not have engaged in partisan gerrymandering, but might
not have violated the U.S. Constitution if they did.133 In addition
130. Id. sec. 5, § 5(b), 120 Stat. at 580–81.
131. Section 5 violations are distinct from section 2 violations. A redistricting plan that
is precleared may still violate section 2. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471,
474, 476–77 (1997) (holding a jurisdiction’s violation of section 2 does not automatically lead
to a violation of section 5).
132. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915–16 (1996) (“Where, as here, we assume avoidance of § 2 liability to be a compelling state interest, we think that the racial classification
would have to realize that goal; the legislative action must, at a minimum, remedy the anticipated violation or achieve compliance to be narrowly tailored.”).
133. A confounding issue with racial and partisan gerrymandering existed in 2011. Being an African American voter can correlate with being a strong Democrat. Consequently,
intentionally moving African Americans who happen to be strong Democrats into or out of
districts could be framed as partisan gerrymandering rather than racial gerrymandering.
Pulling those issues apart is very difficult but very important if partisan gerrymandering
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to the legal rules mapmakers needed to follow, mapmakers tend to
use additional traditional districting criteria when districting.
Those criteria may include respect for existing districts, preservation of political subdivisions, incumbency protection, and the creation of communities of interest.134 The General Assembly stepped
into that complex maze in 2011.
II. POST-2010 CENSUS REDISTRICTING
In 2011, the General Assembly was required to redistrict the
House of Delegates, the state Senate, and Virginia’s congressional
delegation while complying with a complex structure of state and
federal constitutional and statutory constraints. The General Assembly’s tasks were clear—create 100 House of Delegates districts
of roughly 80,010 people, forty Senate districts of roughly 200,026
people, and eleven congressional districts of roughly 727,366 people.135 Virginia’s population growth and shifts between 2000 and
2010 made the General Assembly’s job challenging. The most overpopulated House of Delegates district (the thirteenth) had 110,610
more people than its target population of 80,010; the most underpopulated (the third) had 13,798 fewer people than its target population.136 The most overpopulated Senate district (the thirtythird) had 116,410 more people than its target population of
200,026; the most underpopulated (the first) had 29,751 fewer people than its target population.137 The most overpopulated congressional district (the tenth) had 142,071 more people than its target
population of 727,366; the most underpopulated (the second) had
81,182 fewer people than its target population.138 Population
growth and loss created the need to move many people into and out
of districts, leading to big shifts in some districts.

yields no remedy while racial gerrymandering does. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234,
241–42, 257–58 (2001).
134. Those criteria may differ depending on the jurisdiction. Indeed, traditional districting criteria used in some jurisdictions may be banned in others. Virginia, for instance, has
shifted from embracing incumbency in redistricting to eschewing it. See infra section IV.C.
135. VA. DIV. OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., DRAWING THE LINE 2011: REDISTRICTING IN
VIRGINIA NO. 2, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter DRAWING THE LINE 2011], http://redistricting.dls.
virginia.gov/2010/data/publications/2011Draw2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KN8-S8UG].
136. Id. at 4–5.
137. Id. at 2–3.
138. Id. at 2.
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Each General Assembly chamber was largely responsible for redistricting itself.139 Delegate Steven Christopher Jones, a Republican, led the redistricting of the Republican-controlled House of Delegates.140 Senator Janet Howell, a Democrat, chaired the Senate
Privileges and Elections Committee and led the redistricting of the
Democrat-controlled Senate.141 Delegate William Janis, a Republican, led the congressional redistricting effort.142
The 2011 redistricting process began in earnest with the passage
of resolutions providing redistricting criteria from the House and
Senate Committees on Privileges and Elections. The redistricting
criteria for the House of Delegates, the state Senate, and congressional districts were identical except for suggested maximum deviations from population equality.143 Senate districts were allowed a
maximum deviation from equality of plus or minus two percent.144
House districts were allowed a maximum deviation from equality
of plus or minus one percent.145 Congressional districts were provided no deviation at all,146 with the Senate resolution stating:
“The population of each [congressional] district shall be as nearly
equal to the population of every other district as practicable.”147
The resolutions provided a few requirements and a few guidelines but afforded mapmakers latitude in how those guidelines
were met. Districts would be single-member districts that complied
with state constitutional provisions, federal constitutional provisions, and the Voting Rights Act.148 Compliance with the VRA required avoiding “unwarranted retrogression or dilution of racial or
139. The House Committee on Privileges and Elections issued its House of Delegates
District Criteria. See H. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2011). The Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections likewise issued its Senate
District Criteria. See S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2011).
140. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 796 (2017) (noting
Delegate Jones’s role in House of Delegates redistricting).
141. See Christopher R. Nolen & Jeff Palmore, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Election
Law and Government Ethics, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 119, 139–41 (2011) (discussing the 2011
redistricting process).
142. See Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73514,
at *2–4 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015) (noting Delegate Janis’s role in congressional redistricting).
143. For a discussion of the value of having different districting principles for districting
different legislatures, see Chambers, supra note 16, at 163–64.
144. S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, supra note 139.
145. H. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, supra note 139.
146. DRAWING THE LINE 2011, supra note 135, at 1–2.
147. S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 2, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2011).
148. S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, supra note 139; H. Comm. on Privileges
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ethnic minority voting strength.”149 Districts needed to be based on
communities of interest; the factors that could help create a community of interest included “economic factors, social factors, cultural factors, geographic features, governmental jurisdictions and
service delivery areas, political beliefs, voting trends, and incumbency considerations.”150 Those factors provided mapmakers
bounded discretion to craft the districts as they thought best, subject to the previously mentioned legal requirements.
Race was the most complicated and confounding factor in redistricting and its aftermath. The racial issues were difficult in part
because most of Virginia’s majority-minority districts had become
underpopulated in the prior decade. Of the twelve majority African
American state House districts, ten were underpopulated by between three thousand to twelve thousand people, with the other
two within one thousand people of the target population of
80,010.151 Of the five majority African American state Senate districts, four were underpopulated by between about sixteen thousand to twenty-five thousand people, with the remaining district
overpopulated by about two thousand people more than the target
population of 200,026.152 The single majority African American
congressional district (the third) was underpopulated by almost
sixty-four thousand people versus the target population of
727,366.153 Creating equipopulous districts required moving significant numbers of people into these districts. Mapmakers had to
consider how to do so consistent with the VRA and other requirements. Keeping those districts majority African American might
mean moving people into and out of those districts with consciousness of, or because of, their race. That was a dangerous game.
The mapmakers maintained all majority-minority districts that
had existed in the 2001 plans, keeping the Black Voting Age Population (“BVAP”) above 50% in those districts.154 The BVAP does
& Elections Res. 1, supra note 139.
149. See S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, supra note 139; H. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, supra note 139.
150. See H. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, supra note 139. For discussion of
communities of interest, see Chambers, supra note 16, at 179–80.
151. DRAWING THE LINE 2011, supra note 135, at 4–5, 9–10.
152. Id. at 2–3, 6–7.
153. Id. at 2, 6.
154. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 8–10, Virginia v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv00885, 2011 WL 9203778 (D.D.C. filed May 9, 2011) (noting BVAP percentage for House of
Delegates and Senate districts from 2001 districts and 2011 districts); Personhuballah v.
Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 562 (E.D. Va. 2016) (discussing the state’s decision to keep
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not necessarily track the percentage of Black registered voters in
a district. If Black voters are registered at a lower rate than nonBlacks, the BVAP may overstate the voting power of Blacks in the
district. A district with a 51% BVAP may not functionally be a majority-minority district in which Blacks can elect their representative of choice. Conversely, in some situations, a district with a
BVAP under 50% may effectively be a majority-minority district.155
The BVAP in the five majority-minority Senate districts the mapmakers drew in 2011 fell to a range of 50.8%–53.6% from a range
of 55.0%–58.5% in the 2001 districts.156
The mapmakers for the House districts used a 55% minimum
BVAP when redistricting majority-minority districts.157 They argued in subsequent litigation they believed the 55% minimum was
appropriate to gain preclearance and ensure no retrogression regarding the ability of Black voters to elect representatives of their
choice would occur.158 In the twelve majority-minority districts the
mapmakers drew, the BVAP range rose from 53.4%–59.7% in the
2001 districts to 55.3%–60.7% in the 2011 districts.159 The House
redistricting was adopted and precleared in 2011.160
The House and the Senate combined their redistricting plans
into one package and sent it to Governor McDonnell, who vetoed
the package, citing concerns with the Senate redistricting.161 Two
weeks later, Governor McDonnell approved new House and Senate
redistricting plans.162 The legislation was precleared by the DOJ
with the new districts being used in the 2011 state legislative elections.163

BVAP percentage in Virginia’s only majority-minority congressional district above 50%).
155. For a discussion regarding the relationship between voting age population, citizenship voting age population, and voters, see LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 423–25 (2006).
156. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 154, at 9.
157. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2017) (noting
use of 55% BVAP minimum).
158. Id. at 795–96.
159. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 154, at 10.
160. Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 796 (“In June 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice precleared the plan.”).
161. Governor’s Veto Message, H.B. 5001, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess. 2011).
162. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 141 F. Supp. 3d 505, 522 (E.D. Va.
2015).
163. Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 796.
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The mapmakers for the congressional districts also used a 55%
minimum BVAP, ostensibly for the same reason—non-retrogression—the House mapmakers did.164 The congressional redistricting map was the most contentious, with the House of Delegates
and the Senate producing their own maps. The House map appeared to be a revision of the 2001 congressional districts, with a
focus on incumbency protection. Delegate Janis, who led the congressional redistricting effort, spoke to each incumbent congressional representative to get their assent to the districting plan.165
The new map sought to retain the single majority-minority congressional district (the third) and increase its BVAP from 53.1% to
56.3%.166 The congressional district with the next highest BVAP
(the fourth) was adjacent to the third and would have a BVAP of
31.3%.167 The Senate map, offered by Senator Mamie Locke, sought
to create one majority-minority district with a 51% BVAP and a
possible crossover district with a 42% BVAP.168 The House of Delegates and the Senate could not agree on a map in 2011 to send
Governor McDonnell and moved congressional redistricting to
2012.169 Eventually, the House’s congressional redistricting plan
was adopted and precleared in 2012.170
The post-2010 census redistricting arguably followed the legal
doctrine then in place. The mapmakers addressed population
equality, race, and partisan advantage. The districts were well
within the population deviation allowances: every Senate district
was within two percent of population equality,171 every House district was within one percent of population equality,172 and every

164. Page v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, No. 3:13cv678, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73514, at
*2–4, *27–28 (E.D. Va. June 5, 2015).
165. Id. at *72–73 (Payne, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at *11–12 (majority opinion).
167. See Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 565 (E.D. Va. 2016).
168. See Voting Age Population, SB 5004 Congressional Districts; Changes in Boundaries, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/Data/congressional%
20plans/SB5004_Locke/SB5004_Locke.pdf [https://perma.cc/5GE8-9GPS].
169. Page, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73514, at *11.
170. Id.
171. See Senate Plan Population Totals, HB 5005 House of Delegates and Senate Districts; Changes in Boundaries, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/
2010/Data/senate%20plans/HB5005_passed_042811_senateplan/HB5005_passed_042811
_senateplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJP7-W6U9].
172. See House Plan Population Totals, HB 5005 House of Delegates and Senate Districts;
Changes in Boundaries, VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/
Data/house%20plans/hb5005_passed_042811_houseplan/hb5005_passed_042811_housepla
n.pdf [https://perma.cc/CAT5-UPVS].
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congressional district was within just one person of population
equality.173
The mapmakers argued they considered race only as much as
necessary to maintain majority-minority districts and to guarantee
no retrogression with respect to minority voters’ ability to elect the
representatives of their choice.174 The Senate redistricting plan reflected the Senate’s belief it could create majority-minority districts with BVAPs between 50% and 55%.175 Those who led the redistricting of the House and the congressional seats argued the
55% minimum BVAP was necessary.176 The minimum may have
been an incorrect response to a reasonable interpretation of the
2006 amendments to the VRA. The amendments deemed retrogression to bar backsliding regarding minority voters’ ability to
elect their representatives of choice.177 That suggests a majorityminority district may need to remain a majority-minority district
in which minority voters are able to elect their representative of
choice with no help. If a typical majority-minority district requires
at least a 50% BVAP, a 55% BVAP would appear to provide a cushion to guarantee the minority voters in the district will elect their
representative of choice. If the cushion is reasonable, a 55% BVAP
is sensible. If the cushion is not necessary, putting more Black voters than necessary in a district looks like packing. Given the majority African American House districts and congressional district
were underpopulated, repopulating them and raising their BVAP
percentage involved intentionally moving minority voters into districts. That might have been acceptable had the House and congressional mapmakers shown a 55% minimum BVAP was necessary to keep the districts effectively majority minority. They failed
to do the analysis for all but one district.178

173. See Population Totals, HB 251 Congressional Districts; Changes in Boundaries,
VA.’S LEGIS. INFO. SYS., http://redistricting.dls.virginia.gov/2010/data/congressional%20pla
ns/2012%20HB251_Bell/HB251_Bell.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2GC-5UN3].
174. See Page, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73514, at *3–4.
175. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 154, at 9 (noting BVAP percentage for 2011 Senate districts between 50% and 55%).
176. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 795–96 (2017) (discussing the genesis of the 55% BVAP minimum).
177. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, sec. 5, § 5(d), 120 Stat. 577,
580–81 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10304(d)) (“The purpose of subsection (b) of this
section is to protect the ability of such citizens to elect their preferred candidates of choice.”).
178. See Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 794–95, 802.
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Gerrymandering was another lurking concern. The Governor
claimed in his veto message the redistricting plan for the Senate
was insufficiently bipartisan and involved noncompact districts.179
He signed a resubmitted Senate map two weeks later.180 Whether
the redistricting reflected partisan advantage is difficult to
judge.181 Eventually, all maps were approved and precleared, with
the Senate map being the least litigated over the ensuing decade.
The redistricting process was difficult; the litigation over the ensuing decade was brutal.
III. THE CHANGED LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR REDISTRICTING
SINCE 2011
The legal landscape regarding redistricting has changed since
2011. The law has changed little in some areas, such as compactness, contiguousness, and the OPOV doctrine. The law has
changed significantly in other areas, such as preclearance. Taken
together, the doctrinal changes regarding districting have significantly altered the structure a mapmaker must comply with when
redistricting in 2021.
A. Contiguity and Compactness
The law regarding contiguousness and compactness in Virginia
was clarified but not significantly altered in the past decade. In
Vesilind v. Virginia State Board of Elections,182 plaintiffs challenged numerous state House and Senate districts from the 2011
redistricting, arguing they were not compact.183 The Supreme
Court of Virginia reaffirmed that districts are constitutional if
their compactness is “fairly debatable.”184 That continues to provide mapmakers with significant discretion.
179. Governor’s Veto Message, supra note 161.
180. Andrew Cain, McDonnell Signs Redistricting Bill, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Apr. 30,
2011), https://richmond.com/news/mcdonnell-signs-redistricting-bill/article_32689192-4ee1
-525e-9f5d-6d7517a7c968.html [https://perma.cc/5MH9-P2RP] (noting Governor McDonnell
signed the resubmitted redistricting bill, with the legislation moving DOJ for preclearance
under section 5 of the VRA).
181. The Supreme Court could not determine what standard to use to judge partisan
gerrymandering before deeming it a political question. See discussion supra section I.C;
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
182. 295 Va. 427, 813 S.E.2d 739 (2018).
183. Id. at 432–33, 813 S.E.2d at 741–42.
184. Id. at 444–45, 452, 813 S.E.2d at 748, 753 (“Thus, there is evidence to support the
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Compactness can be measured objectively but is not under Virginia law. Numerous objective measures of compactness exist, but
none are considered the best.185 Even if there were a best measure,
it might not matter because Virginia districts need not be as compact as possible.186 A minimum standard of compactness may be
impossible to find. The functional minimum compactness standard
may consist of comparing today’s districts with yesteryear’s least
compact districts.187 Compactness is a subjective inquiry under
Virginia law,188 which is unsurprising given the Vesilind court’s
acknowledgment that compactness is an “abstract concept.”189
Electoral districts must be compact, but compactness is only one
of several appropriate redistricting principles that can be used together to create an acceptable district.190 The compactness standard’s lack of clarity makes complying with Virginia’s contiguousness and compactness requirements easy.191 Indeed, the Vesilind
court deemed a House district that wrapped around another district like a horseshoe to be compact.192 Consequently, Virginia’s bar
for contiguousness and compactness is so low that it functionally
may be no bar at all.

ruling that the determination of the General Assembly regarding compactness of the Challenged Districts is fairly debatable, and not clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted, and we must uphold the legislature’s decision to draw the Challenged Districts as it
did.”).
185. Id. at 437, 813 S.E.2d at 744. Indeed, in support of its claim all 2011 state legislative
districts were compact, the Virginia Attorney General’s Office submitted the results of three
different numerical measures of compactness in its preclearance submission to DOJ required under section 5 of the VRA. Id. at 435, 438, 813 S.E.2d at 743, 745.
186. Id. at 448, 813 S.E.2d at 750.
187. The Vesilind court compared the districts it was analyzing to those deemed compact
in prior litigation. Id. at 450, 813 S.E.2d at 752.
188. Id. at 448, 813 S.E.2d at 751 (noting the compactness inquiry is not objective like
the equal population standard).
189. Id. at 444, 813 S.E.2d at 748.
190. Id. at 452, 813 S.E.2d at 753 (“Our Constitution speaks to the result of the redistricting process, and mandates that districts be compact in the end. It does not attempt to
curtail the legislative process that creates the end result. Nor does it require that compactness be given priority over other considerations, much less establish a standard to determine whether the legislature gave proper priority to compactness.”).
191. See id. at 444, 813 S.E.2d at 743 (“The party challenging an enactment has the
burden of proving that the statute is unconstitutional, and every reasonable doubt regarding the constitutionality of a legislative enactment must be resolved in favor of its validity.”).
192. Id. at 449, 813 S.E.2d at 751; see House of Delegates District 72, VA. PUB. ACCESS
PROJECT, https://www.vpap.org/offices/house-of-delegates-72/redistricting/ [https://perma.
cc/BC2Z-GE2C]
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B. One Person-One Vote
The One Person-One Vote doctrine has not changed significantly
in the past decade. In Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission,193 the Supreme Court reiterated its rules on OPOV.
The Equal Protection Clause requires districts be populated as
close to equality as practicable, with justifiable deviations allowed.194 Total deviations of less than ten percent for state legislative districts are presumed acceptable.195 Though there is no safe
harbor for a maximum total deviation under ten percent, a plaintiff’s claim that a deviation under ten percent should not be allowed
for a state legislative districting plan will rarely be successful.196
The law has not changed with respect to population deviations regarding congressional districts. As the Court noted in Tennant v.
Jefferson County Commission,197 deviations from perfect equality
are allowed, but they need to be justified and are smaller than deviations allowed for state legislative districts.198
C. Partisan Gerrymandering
In Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court ruled partisan
gerrymandering triggers a political question that the federal courts
have no jurisdiction to resolve.199 The Justices maintained extreme
partisan gerrymandering is problematic and inconsistent with
democratic principles, but noted insufficient legal standards for
judging whether partisan gerrymandering claims exist.200 The
193. 136 S. Ct. 1301 (2016).
194. Id. at 1306.
195. Id. at 1305 (“Because the maximum population deviation between the largest and
the smallest district is less than 10%, the appellants cannot simply rely upon the numbers
to show that the plan violates the Constitution.”).
196. Id. at 1307.
197. 567 U.S. 758 (2012).
198. See id. at 759 (noting deviations are allowed even in congressional districting if the
mapmaker has engaged in “a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality” (quoting
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983))).
199. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019) (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering claims
present political questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”).
200. See id. at 2506 (“Excessive partisanship in districting leads to results that reasonably seem unjust.”); id. at 2509 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The partisan gerrymanders in these
cases deprived citizens of the most fundamental of their constitutional rights: the rights to
participate equally in the political process, to join with others to advance political beliefs,
and to choose their political representatives. In so doing, the partisan gerrymanders here
debased and dishonored our democracy, turning upside-down the core American idea that
all governmental power derives from the people.”).
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Rucho Court suggested states could alleviate partisan gerrymandering through state law or redistricting commissions.201 As noted
and discussed infra, the General Assembly passed legislation in
2020 essentially barring partisan gerrymandering202 and Virginians created the Virginia Redistricting Commission with the passage of Constitutional Amendment 1 in November 2020.203
D. Race and Redistricting
Race remains the thorniest issue in redistricting. Over the last
decade, the legal doctrine on race and redistricting has been clarified in some areas and significantly altered in other areas. The issues related to race and redistricting are interrelated. The Fourteenth Amendment’s race predominance test limits the use of race
without strong justification. The Voting Rights Act is often used as
the justification for the use of race. Doctrinal changes—even small
changes—in race predominance or VRA doctrine may have an outsized effect on a mapmaker’s ability to redistrict using race to provide equal voting rights to minority voters. Mapmakers must use
race to ensure equal voting rights but must not use race so much
that the use violates equal protection.
1. Race Predominance and the Fourteenth Amendment
Mapmakers may use race in redistricting when race is not a predominant factor that subverts traditional districting principles.204
Race predominance doctrine has not changed much in the last decade, but the context in which race predominance tends to arise has
changed. Prior to 2011, the race predominance test was used primarily by nonminority voters ostensibly to protect their voting

201. Id. at 2507 (majority opinion).
202. See discussion infra section IV.A.3.
203. See discussion infra section IV.B.
204. See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463–64 (2017) (noting the need for factors
such as “compactness, respect for political subdivisions, [and] partisan advantage” to be
subordinated to race for race to become the predominant factor). However, this rule might
change. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama (ALBC), 575 U.S. 254, 275 (2015)
(“Finally, we note that our discussion in this section is limited to correcting the District
Court’s misapplication of the ‘predominance’ test for strict scrutiny discussed in Miller. It
does not express a view on the question [of] whether the intentional use of race in redistricting, even in the absence of proof that traditional districting principles were subordinated to
race, triggers strict scrutiny.” (citation omitted)).
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rights.205 In the last decade, race predominance has become an argument minority-race voters use to argue legislatures are improperly using race to redistrict.206 In these cases, the Supreme Court
has reemphasized that race predominance is case and context specific, with actions that might seem to clearly trigger race predominance possibly not doing so. Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v.
Alabama (ALBC),207 Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections,208 and Cooper v. Harris209 involve legislatures moving significant numbers of voters into and out of districts based on race.
Those actions might seem to clearly trigger race predominance, but
they may not. The Court suggests that any use of race, even the
explicit use of race, might not trigger race predominance unless its
use subverts traditional districting principles.210
The Court in ALBC reviewed Alabama’s redistricting of its state
legislative districts in the wake of the 2010 census.211 Alabama’s
majority-minority districts had become underpopulated since the
state redistricted after the 2000 census, so the state was required
to move voters into those districts to comply with the Constitution’s
OPOV standard.212 The overwhelming majority of voters Alabama
moved into the majority-minority districts in the course of redistricting were minority-race voters, even though those districts
would have remained majority-minority districts had a more racially diverse set of voters been placed in the districts.213 Plaintiffs
argued the redistricting was a racial gerrymander involving race
predominance because the voters who were moved into the majority-minority districts were moved because of their race.214 Arguing
the VRA required it to pack so many African American voters into
majority-minority districts so that redistricting would not lessen
the opportunity for minority voters to elect their representatives of

205. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636–37 (1993).
206. See, e.g., Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 794 (2017);
ALBC, 575 U.S. at 258.
207. 575 U.S. 254.
208. 137 S. Ct. 788.
209. 137 S. Ct. 1455.
210. See, e.g., ALBC, 575 U.S. at 272 (discussing the use of race and the racial predominance test).
211. See id. at 258.
212. See id. at 259–60.
213. Id. at 277–78 (noting the BVAP percentage could fall a fair amount and still yield
the election of the candidate preferred by the minority voters in the district).
214. Id. at 260.
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choice,215 Alabama claimed it needed to maintain the same BVAP
percentage in each majority-minority district after redistricting as
the districts had before redistricting.216
Given the underpopulation and the high BVAP percentage of
some of the districts, the legislature needed to put an almost exclusively African American group of voters into some of the districts.
In one district with a 72% BVAP, only thirty-six of nearly sixteen
thousand people moved into the district were white.217 Rather than
deem the movement of people because of their race to be clear race
predominance, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case for the plaintiffs to present their racial gerrymandering
claims again, suggesting the case likely involved race predominance, but might not.218 That was a bit surprising given the opinion
noted a race-predominance racial gerrymander claim is premised
on the harm a voter suffers from being racially classified and
moved around because of race, not from the harm to the voter’s
voting power.219
In Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, plaintiffs
challenged Virginia’s 2011 state legislative redistricting, claiming
race was used as a predominant factor in redistricting multiple
House of Delegates districts.220 As in ALBC, the combination of underpopulated districts and the desire to keep BVAP percentages
above a minimum figure guaranteed many people would be moved
into, and possibly out of, districts based on their race.221 The mapmakers used a 55% minimum BVAP when creating majority-minority districts ostensibly to ensure African American voters in the
districts could elect their candidates of choice.222 The trial court decided the BVAP minimum and the movement of voters did not constitute race predominance in eleven of twelve districts at issue, in

215. Id. at 259.
216. Id. at 259–60.
217. Id. at 260 (“[P]rior to redistricting, 72.75% of District 26’s population was black.
Accordingly, Alabama’s plan added 15,785 new individuals, and only 36 of those newly
added individuals were white.”).
218. Id. at 279.
219. Id. at 263.
220. 137 S. Ct. 788, 794–95 (2017).
221. Id. at 795.
222. Id. at 794–95; see Personhuballah v. Alcorn, 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 556–67 (E.D. Va.
2016) (noting the same rule was used for Virginia’s congressional redistricting).
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part because the districts were consistent with districts drawn using traditional districting principles.223 The Supreme Court disagreed, noting race can be a predominant factor even if traditional
districting factors are used.224 The key to the Equal Protection violation is not whether the redistricting created districts inconsistent
with traditional districting criteria, but whether the racial classification predominated.225 The Court ruled the 55% minimum
BVAP might not prove racial predominance though race was explicitly used in redistricting. Rather than deem the use of the minimum BVAP race predominance per se, the Court remanded the
case and allowed the trial court to decide the issue with respect to
eleven of the twelve districts at issue.226 The Court agreed, however, with the trial court’s original ruling that race was a predominant factor in redistricting with respect to the remaining district
and that the state’s use of race survived strict scrutiny.227 The Bethune-Hill decision was just as surprising as the result in ALBC
because the Bethune-Hill Court emphasized the ALBC Court’s argument that the Equal Protection concern is the moving of people
based on race, not the effect the movement has on voting rights.228
In Cooper v. Harris, the Court reviewed North Carolina’s redistricting of two congressional districts which turned the crossover
districts into majority-minority districts.229 One district was underpopulated by about one hundred thousand people, and became
a majority-minority district by the movement of a significant number of minority voters into the district.230 The mapmakers intentionally increased the BVAP to over 50%—from 48.6% to 52.7%—
in part by specifically reaching out to heavily African American areas to attach them to the district.231 The Court agreed with the trial
court’s decision that race predominance had been proven regarding
223. Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 794 (noting the trial court held that for race to predominate in redistricting, an actual conflict between the use of race and traditional districting
criteria must exist).
224. Id. at 797–98. Though the Court also noted it had never found race predominance
when a district conformed to traditional districting principles. Id. at 799.
225. Id. at 798.
226. Id. at 800–02.
227. Id. at 801. The Court noted that it assumed without deciding that compliance with
section 5 remained a compelling state interest. Id.
228. See id. at 797.
229. 37 S. Ct. 1455, 1465–66 (2017) (describing the electoral success of candidates favored by minority voters in districts that had BVAPs under 50%).
230. Id. at 1466.
231. See id. (noting that bringing areas into the district required “a finger-like extension
of the district’s western line”).
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that district.232 The second district became a majority-minority district by exchanging a significant number of white voters for minority voters, increasing the BVAP from 43.8% to 50.7%.233 The trial
court determined race predominated, though the defendants argued the increased BVAP percentage was based on partisan gerrymandering rather than racial gerrymandering.234 The Court allowed that ruling to stand, noting the rigorous and involved
inquiry a court must, and the district court did, engage in to decide
the issue.235 The decisions the Court made in Cooper are consistent
with a case- and context-specific analysis of race predominance.
Race predominance remains a doctrine in tension. It stems from
the Fourteenth Amendment bar on racial classifications but allows
the use of (not merely the consciousness of) race in redistricting.
Functionally, race becomes a districting principle that may not significantly overshadow other districting principles.236 Determining
when race overpowers the other traditional redistricting principles
is difficult. First, traditional districting principles tend to be pliable even when compliance with them is mandatory, as Virginia’s
loose requirements regarding contiguousness and compactness
suggest. Second, the Court’s assertion that a district can appear to
have been redistricted using traditional criteria but that race may
still be found to be a predominant factor is difficult to square.237
The two pieces of the doctrine—barring the classification of people
based on race and allowing the use of race if it does not subordinate
other districting criteria—are almost impossible to reconcile. A
court may choose which piece of the doctrine to use when analyzing
a case. The Supreme Court’s tendency to focus on the subordination piece today does not guarantee it will do so tomorrow given it
continues to remind observers the core of race predominance is the
bar on racial classification, rather than its effect on voting
rights.238

232. Id. at 1469.
233. Id. at 1466 (“[T]he district gained some 35,000 African-Americans of voting age and
lost some 50,000 whites of that age . . . .”).
234. Id. at 1473.
235. Id. at 1473–74.
236. ALBC, 575 U.S. 254, 272–73 (2015).
237. See Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797–98 (2017).
238. See ALBC, 575 U.S. at 272.
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2. Voting Rights Act Section 2
Section 2’s doctrine has not changed in the last decade, but it
has been reinforced. Thornburg v. Gingles provides the operative
law for section 2 redistricting claims.239 The three Gingles preconditions—minority voters must be capable of being a majority in a
compact, single-member district; minority voters must be cohesive;
and racial bloc voting must keep the minority voters from electing
their candidates of choice—must be satisfied before a section 2
claim is viable.240 The Supreme Court has continued to focus heavily on the preconditions and on ensuring section 2 remedies
squarely address section 2 violations.
In Cooper v. Harris, North Carolina turned a crossover district
into a majority-minority district and the trial court found race predominated in the redistricting.241 North Carolina claimed its fear
of a section 2 violation justified its actions.242 The Supreme Court
rejected the state’s defense, noting that a crossover district that
consistently elects the representative of the minority voters’ choice
suggests the third Gingles precondition—bloc voting—cannot be
proven.243 In this circumstance, North Carolina’s use of race as a
predominant factor in redistricting was not acceptable because the
state had no reason to believe it was required to use race to comply
with the VRA’s section 2 requirements.244
In Abbott v. Perez, the Court reviewed claims that part of Texas’s
redistricting of congressional and state legislative districts violated section 2.245 The Court focused on the Gingles preconditions.246 It closely considered the trial court’s decision finding no

239. See 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
240. For an in-depth discussion of the Gingles preconditions, see Justin Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire: Citizen Commission Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1041, 1049–55 (2013).
241. 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017).
242. Id. at 1469.
243. Id. at 1470.
244. Id. at 1472.
245. 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313–14, 2330 (2018).
246. Id. at 2330–31 (“To make out a §2 ‘effects’ claim, a plaintiff must establish the three
so-called ‘Gingles factors.’ These are (1) a geographically compact minority population sufficient to constitute a majority in a single-member district, (2) political cohesion among the
members of the minority group, and (3) bloc voting by the majority to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.”).
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bloc voting to determine if Texas had an obligation to create a Latino opportunity district in a specific part of the state.247 If bloc voting existed, the district had been drawn in the correct location; if
bloc voting did not exist, no section 2 violation existed and the district had been drawn to remedy a nonexistent section 2 violation.248
The need to match the section 2 violation to the section 2 remedy
harkened to the Court’s focus on violations and remedies in League
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.249 Ultimately, the Abbott Court found bloc voting existed and that the remedy matched
the violation.250
3. Voting Rights Act Section 5
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court gutted section 5
of the VRA by invalidating section 4.251 Section 4 defined nearly all
jurisdictions that were subject to preclearance under section 5.252
The Court left section 5 intact but rendered it effectively worthless
for now.253 The Court argued section 4’s formula was based on decades-old data and unfairly treated some states differently than others.254 After deeming section 4 unconstitutional as currently structured, the Court suggested Congress could create a new
constitutionally acceptable section 4 formula based on more recent
data.255 Congress has not yet done so.
Eliminating the preclearance standard for previously covered jurisdictions, like Virginia, is important. For the first time in decades, Virginia redistricting will not be subject to section 5 preclearance in 2021.256 Mapmakers need not worry about retrogression or
backsliding with respect to the ability of minority voters to elect

247. Id. at 2331–32.
248. See id.
249. See supra notes 112–14 and accompanying text; LULAC, 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
250. Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2331–32.
251. 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (“[Congress’s] failure to act leaves us today with no choice
but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional.”).
252. Id. at 537–38 (discussing section 4’s history).
253. See id. at 557 (“We issue no holding on § 5 itself, only on the coverage formula.”).
254. Id. at 551 (arguing no disparity exists between states covered under section 4 and
those not covered under section 4).
255. Id. at 557.
256. Virginia has been a covered jurisdiction for preclearance purposes since 1965. See
Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt
/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5 [https://perma.cc/3PQ9-WR4S] (last updated
Sept. 11, 2020).
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their candidates of choice. The elimination of preclearance also removes section 5 compliance as a compelling state interest for using
race as a predominant factor in redistricting. Cases in which states
sought to justify the movement of many voters based on their race
by reference to preclearance requirements—such as ALBC and Bethune-Hill—would need to be litigated solely on whether race predominance existed, because states would have virtually no chance
to successfully argue their redistricting decisions could survive
strict scrutiny.
E. Summary
The mapmaker’s obligations before the General Assembly met
in 2020 were clear in some respects, and unclear in others. Districts must be roughly equipopulous and must be drawn consistent
with the state’s required districting criteria. The Constitution may
discourage partisan gerrymandering but does not prohibit it. The
state has a continuing obligation to protect equal minority voting
rights and may need to use race to meet that obligation.
Mapmakers may use race when redistricting, but cannot use it
as a predominant factor in a way that subverts other redistricting
principles unless its use can survive strict scrutiny.257 Whether
race has subverted other principles can be unclear.258 Racial gerrymandering and partisan gerrymandering can be intertwined and
may be confused for each other if mapmakers move large chunks
of voters who are of the same race and share a party affiliation.259
Even when the use of race is clear, how much race has been used
or can be used may be unclear.

257. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463–64 (2017) (“[I]f racial considerations predominated over others, the design of the district must withstand strict scrutiny.”).
258. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three
Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1837, 1838–43 (2018) (discussing the lack of clarity).
259. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1473 (noting the difficulty in recognizing and distinguishing
race and political gerrymandering); Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2314 (2018) (“While
the Equal Protection Clause imposes these important restrictions, its application in the field
of districting is complicated. For one thing, because a voter’s race sometimes correlates
closely with political party preference, it may be very difficult for a court to determine
whether a districting decision was based on race or party preference.” (citations omitted));
Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241–45 (2001).
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When the use of race is a predominant factor in redistricting, its
use must serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored
to serve that interest. Compliance with section 2 of the VRA appears to be the only compelling state interest for the predominant
use of race in redistricting in Virginia. A strong basis to believe the
use of race is necessary to comply with section 2 meets the narrow
tailoring prong.260 A state is required to use race as much as necessary, even if race is a predominant factor in redistricting, to comply with section 2 of the VRA. In addition, a state may use race as
a non-predominant factor to protect voting rights as it sees fit. In
its 2020 session, the General Assembly addressed some of these
issues and elided others.
IV. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2020 AND REDISTRICTING
The General Assembly faced a new and simpler legal regime regarding redistricting when its 2020 session opened than when its
2010 session opened. Any possible constitutional limit on partisan
gerrymandering was gone and section 5’s preclearance requirement has been gone for more than half a decade. The General Assembly likely realized mapmakers are free of some legal requirements in place a decade ago and that it could shape redistricting
according to some of its preferences.
The General Assembly made two big moves in its 2020 session
in anticipation of 2021 redistricting. First, it passed legislation
that includes additional redistricting criteria. Whatever entity redistricts—the Virginia Redistricting Commission (“VRC”), or the
Supreme Court of Virginia—presumably will use the criteria. Second, the General Assembly pushed forward the constitutional
amendment that establishes the VRC, diminishes the General Assembly’s role in redistricting and ends the Governor’s role in redistricting. In its 2020 session, the General Assembly started the process of remaking redistricting in Virginia, but it left a few
important issues unresolved.

260. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464 (“When a State invokes the VRA to justify race-based
districting, it must show (to meet the ‘narrow tailoring’ requirement) that it had ‘a strong
basis in evidence’ for concluding that the statute required its action.” (quoting ALBC, 575
U.S. 254, 278 (2015))).
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A. Criteria for 2021 Redistricting
The mapmaker’s task remains the same as in years past. Based
on census data, the mapmakers will need to move people around to
create districts within acceptable population deviations. The newly
legislated redistricting criteria give mapmakers guidance regarding redistricting, but do not tell them exactly what to do or how to
do it.261 The 2020 legislation’s redistricting criteria differ from the
redistricting criteria the Privileges and Elections Committees have
used in redistricting in the past.262 The legislation notes districting
must comply with state and federal constitutional requirements,
the Voting Rights Act, and “relevant judicial decisions relating to
racial and ethnic fairness.”263 It also specifies additional criteria
that appear to move beyond constitutional and statutory enactments, and further defines “community of interest” in a new
way.264 Unless more criteria or explanations of the criteria are
forthcoming, the mapmaker will need to make choices about significant policy issues that are not resolved by the criteria. The different entities that might be responsible for redistricting may have
different views about how to resolve those issues.
1. Equipopulous Districts
The legislation requires roughly equipopulous districts.265 It permits population deviations in state legislative districts up to five
percent,266 which would allow a ten percent total maximum deviation consistent with federal law.267 It provides no population deviations respecting congressional districts. Current OPOV doctrine

261. See Acts of Apr. 22, 2020, chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts __, __ & __, __ (codified
at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04 (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
262. See, e.g., H. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 2, Va. Gen. Assembly (Spec. Sess.
2001) (the House’s adopted 2001 criteria for congressional districts); S. Comm. on Privileges
& Elections Res. 2, supra note 147 (the Senate’s adopted 2011 criteria for congressional
districts).
263. Chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2304.04(2) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
264. Id. at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(5) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
265. Id. at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(1) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
266. Id. at __, __.
267. See Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 136 S. Ct. 1301, 1305 (2016).
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allows deviations in congressional district populations if the deviations are justified.268 Consequently, the legislation is consistent
with, but narrower than, the Supreme Court’s OPOV doctrine.
2. Contiguity and Compactness
The General Assembly modified and refined how contiguity and
compactness are defined and assessed. The law narrows the mapmaker’s latitude but may not have much effect on redistricting. A
district may not be contiguous solely “by connections by water running downstream or upriver . . . .”269 That might mean one part of
a district must be directly across the water from another part of
the same district if the district is bisected by water. Conversely, it
could mean two parts of a district that are separated by water must
be directly connected by a bridge. If the latter, the legislation provides a new restriction.270
The law requires mapmakers consider compactness more objectively when drawing districts. Mapmakers must use numerical
measures to draw districts, but the legislation does not require a
district meet a minimum level of compactness to be deemed “compact.”271 This approach differs from the Supreme Court of Virginia’s approach to compactness in Vesilind v. Virginia State Board
of Elections.272 The Vesilind test is indeterminate with no standard.273 The new law provides a structure for considering compactness when redistricting, but does not appear to provide a clear basis for a court to determine when a district is not compact.
3. Partisan Gerrymandering
The districting criteria ban partisan gerrymandering, noting a
statewide map may not “unduly favor or disfavor any political
party.”274 That is a clear statement against partisan gerrymander-

268. See Tennant v. Jefferson Cty. Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 759 (2012).
269. Chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2304.04(6) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
270. See supra section I.A.
271. Chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2304.04(7) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
272. 295 Va. 427, 813 S.E.2d 739 (2018).
273. Id. at 444–45, 813 S.E.2d at 7480–49.
274. Chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-
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ing, but how the ban would be enforced is not clear. The law appears to recognize districting may favor one political party but allows favor only to a small extent. Only undue favor is banned. How
a mapmaker or court should judge undue favor is not clear. Statistics coupled with behavior during the redistricting process may
demonstrate clear partisan gerrymandering. However, a fair
amount of partisan advantage might exist before statistics appear
to show clear undue favor.275
The language in the legislation suggests what mapmakers
should do. It does not indicate what they must do or explicitly limit
what they can do. The law leaves open whether a mapmaker
should assume the law intends a requirement of rough proportional representation. The legislation explicitly disclaims a right to
proportional representation in its clause regarding minority voting
rights.276 The lack of a disclaimer in this section of the law might
be argued to create such a right, though how the contours of a right
could be divined and how such a right could be proven is unclear.
This provision’s effect is uncertain because it could be interpreted quite differently depending on what entity interprets it—
the VRC, or the Supreme Court of Virginia. The makeup and voting rules of the commission might guarantee that redrawn districts
that systematically favor one party over another will not be passed
out of the commission. However, this says nothing about how the
Supreme Court of Virginia will or should view partisanship if the
court is responsible for drawing the lines. Certainly, the court
would draw districts consistent with its interpretation of the law,
but how it would interpret the law for purposes of drawing maps is
not clear.
4. Race and Redistricting
The legislation notes districting must comport with the Voting
Rights Act and incorporates additional language that largely

304.04(8) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
275. For a discussion of statistics and political partisanship, see Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.
Ct. 1916, 1924 (2018); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2015).
276. Chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2304.04(3) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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tracks the language and the doctrine of section 2 of the VRA.277 For
example, the legislation states the following:
A violation of this subdivision is established if, on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that districts were drawn in
such a way that members of a racial or language minority group are
dispersed into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of voters or are concentrated into districts where they constitute
an excessive majority.278

The only difference between the VRA and the Virginia legislation
is the Virginia legislation’s explicit reference to a bar on “cracking”
minority voters into multiple districts and “packing” minority voters into fewer districts.279 Cracking and packing ensures those voters have less of an opportunity to elect their representatives in similar number to their share of the population.280 The limitation on
cracking and packing has been a part of section 2 doctrine for
years.281
The legislation appears to suggest mapmakers are obligated to
consider drawing crossover districts where sensible rather than
merely as a remedy for a section 2 violation. The legislation notes:
Districts shall be drawn to give racial and language minorities an
equal opportunity to participate in the political process and shall not
dilute or diminish their ability to elect candidates of choice either
alone or in coalition with others.282

However, whether the legislation forces mapmakers to draw crossover districts whenever the mapmaker can, short of race predominance, is unclear. If a mapmaker aggressively draws crossover districts, the mapmaker may run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment
doctrine on racial predominance.283 The desire to comply with an
aggressive reading of a state statute may not qualify as a compelling state interest in the absence of a section 2 violation.

277. Id. at __, __.
278. Id. at __, __.
279. See id. at __, __.
280. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 286 n.7 (2004) (explaining the practices of
cracking and packing).
281. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 670 (1993) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing racial
gerrymanders and cracking and packing); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153–54 (1993).
282. Chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(4)
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
283. See supra section III.D.1.
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The functional question is whether these sections of the statute
are meant to encourage mapmakers to maximize the strength of
minority voters consistent with the Constitution and VRA, or
merely as a reminder that crossover districts—not just majorityminority districts—can help discharge the state’s VRA obligations
and the desire to protect minority voters’ rights.284 The reminder
might be needed, because the post-2010 census redistricting focused on retaining majority-minority districts until the Personhuballah v. Alcorn litigation created two crossover congressional districts.285 The issue is particularly tricky given that the legislation
notes that it provides no right to proportional representation for
minority voters.286 These provisions are arguably at cross purposes
and could lead different mapmakers to interpret the sections differently.
For example, the criteria provide little if any guidance on how a
mapmaker should approach Virginia’s Third and Fourth Congressional Districts. Both are crossover districts represented by African
American congressmen.287 It is possible that no section 2 claim exists that would require both districts to be kept. If so, keeping the
districts would depend on the mapmaker’s interpretation of the criteria. Whether the criteria should be read to explicitly encourage a
mapmaker to try hard to keep the two crossover districts, to consider drawing a majority-minority district while leaving the other
district as an influence district at best, or merely to be open to
keeping the districts as crossover districts if they arise organically
based on the 2020 census figures is not clear.

284. The same issue arises with a provision in the proposed constitutional amendment,
which requires: “Districts shall provide, where practicable, opportunities for racial and ethnic communities to elect candidates of their choice.” S.J. Res. 18, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2020) (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A).
285. 155 F. Supp. 3d 552, 565 (E.D. Va. 2016); see supra Part II.
286. Chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(3)
(Cum. Supp. 2020)).
287. Congressman Robert Scott represents the Third Congressional District and has
been in Congress since 1993; Congressman A. Donald McEachin represents the Fourth Congressional District and has been in Congress since 2017. See Membership, CONG. BLACK
CAUCUS, https://cbc.house.gov/membership [https://perma.cc/83JR-RLNW]. When the Districts were drawn, the Third had a 45.3% BVAP, and the Fourth had a 40.9% BVAP. See
Personhuballah, 155 F. Supp. 3d at 565.
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5. Communities of Interest
The new criteria require mapmakers to preserve “communities
of interest,” defining a community of interest as “a neighborhood
or any geographically defined group of people living in an area who
share similar social, cultural, and economic interests.”288 The definition explains why a group of people might be given common representation. If people live in the same neighborhood, they may care
about similar issues even if they disagree about how to resolve
those issues. However, the law does not require a district to comprise a single community of interest. Rather, it suggests a community of interest should not be divided into different districts. Multiple communities of interest may be joined in a single district
without violating the letter or spirit of the law.
The law also defines what a community of interest is not. A community of interest is not “a community based upon political affiliation or relationship with a political party, elected official, or candidate for office.”289 That description is a bit odd given that a
community of interest is defined as a group having similar “social,
cultural and economic interests.”290 Those interests do not always
track political affiliation, but they could. The General Assembly
may not wish for a community of interest to be based on political
affiliation and may deem political cohesion to be an unworthy basis
on which to draw a district. However, if a geographically defined
group of people overwhelmingly share the same political views,
deeming that grouping not to be a community of interest is odd,
and maybe telling. Considerations related to politics and incumbency were a part of the 2011 redistricting criteria.291 It is possible
the 2020 General Assembly wanted to remove politics and incumbency as a consideration in redistricting and thought redefining
“communities of interest” was the best way to accomplish the task.
Unfortunately, defining communities of interest as nonpolitical
can be at cross purposes with protecting minority voters’ rights.
The section 2 Gingles preconditions require a geographically compact, politically cohesive group of minority voters be generally unable to elect their candidates of choice because of racial bloc voting.
288. Chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2304.04(5) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
289. Id. at __, __.
290. Id. at __, __.
291. S. Comm. on Privileges & Elections Res. 1, supra note 139.
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Those preconditions appear to assume politically based communities of interest. If section 2 has been (or may be) violated if a specific district is not drawn, the legislation’s definition of community
of interest does not matter. However, assume that section 2 has
not and will not be violated by a refusal to draw a crossover district,
but the state wants to draw a crossover district. The legislation’s
definition of community of interest suggests that the political cohesiveness of the group of minority voters should not be considered
in redistricting, though their race might be considered in redistricting.
6. A Lingering Issue
The redistricting criteria are standard and reasonable, but they
might apply differently depending on what set of districts is being
constructed. For example, a community of interest analysis looks
different depending on whether one is thinking about House of Delegates districts of eighty thousand people, Senate districts of two
hundred thousand people, or congressional districts of seven hundred twenty-seven thousand people. In addition, constructing a
community of interest around the issues Congress addresses may
be different than constructing a community of interest around the
issues the General Assembly addresses. That might sound strange,
but the difference is recognized in the OPOV doctrine. Deviations
with respect to state legislative districts can be larger than those
for congressional districts.292 This is so in part because some districting criteria track communities of interest and should be adhered to when redistricting state legislative districts, but need not
be adhered to when redistricting congressional districts because
they do not track communities of interest with respect to Congress.
For example, keeping jurisdictions whole and providing them with
common representation may be important for state legislative districts given the issues state legislatures decide, but may not be important when considering the issues Congress decides. The redistricting criteria do not address this issue.

292. Compare Harris v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 36 S. Ct. 1301, 1305–06
(2016) (discussing deviations in state legislative districts), with Tennant v. Jefferson Cty.
Comm’n, 567 U.S. 758, 759 (2012) (discussing deviations in congressional districts).
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B. The Virginia Redistricting Commission
The General Assembly moved forward on the constitutional
amendment that gave the responsibility to redistrict to the Virginia Redistricting Commission. The VRC is an attempt to address
partisan gerrymandering and is consistent with the Supreme
Court’s invitation for states to do so in Rucho v. Common Cause.293
Many states have attempted to lessen the effect of politics in redistricting by establishing independent or semi-independent redistricting commissions.294 States may use independent redistricting
commissions to apportion state legislative districts. In Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, the Supreme Court ruled states may also redistrict their congressional districts through a purely independent redistricting
commission.295 Under the Arizona State Legislature doctrine, the
VRC would be allowed to redistrict congressional districts.296 The
VRC does not independently redistrict electoral districts; it drafts
a redistricting plan the General Assembly must accept or reject
without changes.297
The VRC will have sixteen members—eight legislators and eight
citizens.298 The eight legislators include four members of the House
of Delegates and four members of the state Senate.299 The legislators from the House consist of two members from each of the two
parties with the most members in the House.300 The legislators
from the Senate consist of two members from each of the two parties with the most members in the Senate.301 The citizen members
are chosen by a panel of retired Virginia state circuit court judges
293. 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).
294. See, e.g., Justin Levitt, Democracy on the High Wire: Citizen Commission Implementation of the Voting Rights Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1041, 1043–47 (2013) (discussing California’s Citizens Redistricting Commission). For a listing of states with independent and
advisory citizen districting commissions, see Independent and Advisory Citizen Redistricting Commissions, COMMON CAUSE, https://www.commoncause.org/independent-redistricting-commissions/ [https://perma.cc/36GA-BCG7].
295. 576 U.S. 787, 793 (2015).
296. See Franita Tolson, Election Law “Federalism” and the Limits of the Antidiscrimination Framework, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2211, 2241–42 (2018) (discussing the latitude
given to states to reapportion their congressional districts).
297. S.J. Res. 18, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2020) (proposed amendment to VA.
CONST. art. II, § 6-A(e)).
298. Id. (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(b)).
299. Id. (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(b)(1)).
300. Id. (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(b)(1)(C)–(D)).
301. Id. (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(b)(1)(A)–(B)).
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from lists provided by the Speaker of the House of Delegates, the
leader of the party with the second-most members in the House of
Delegates, the President pro tempore of the Senate, and the leader
of the party with the second-most members in the state Senate.302
The VRC creates a proposed set of maps. At least six of the legislators and six of the citizen members must agree to a redistricting
plan before the plan is sent to the General Assembly for an up-ordown vote with no changes.303 If the VRC and General Assembly
do not pass maps in the allotted time, the Supreme Court of Virginia will draw the maps.304
The VRC is an attempt to remove partisan politics from the redistricting process by removing the power to redistrict from the
General Assembly. Though the General Assembly appears ready
to relinquish the power to draw the lines, it did not relinquish the
power to tell the VRC how to draw the lines. That is the effect of
the General Assembly’s codification of the redistricting criteria.
The criteria provide the VRC guidelines for redistricting, but also
provide latitude for the VRC to redistrict in ways the General Assembly might not expect.
Presumably, any map the VRC presents to the General Assembly will not be partisan because it will have garnered approval from
at least three-quarters of the VRC’s legislative members and citizen members. What will happen if the Commission does not agree
on a map, for partisan or nonpartisan reasons, is not clear. Without
an agreement, the Supreme Court of Virginia redistricts. The court
does not have a supermajority requirement like the VRC. Its redistricting is limited by the redistricting criteria, but its interpretation of the criteria will be its own. That process could create a set
of maps with which virtually no one is happy.
C. Open Issues
The General Assembly left a few large issues open in 2020. First,
the General Assembly did not address whether mapmakers should
start redistricting from scratch or keep current districts as the
baseline. The criteria the General Assembly passed attempt to remove politics and incumbency from the redistricting process as

302. Id. (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(b)(2)(A)–(B)).
303. Id. (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(d)–(e)).
304. Id. (proposed amendment to VA. CONST. art. II, § 6-A(f)–(g)).
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much as possible.305 The General Assembly also added a more robust form of compactness. If incumbency was a driving factor behind gerrymandered districts, and if compactness is a real districting value, whatever entity redistricts in 2021 arguably should start
from scratch. Conversely, the General Assembly may merely want
the current districts to be more compact. Starting from scratch may
lead to serious dislocation and might eliminate crossover or majority-minority districts unless those districts would occur organically
based on geography and population. Whatever is desired, the mapmaker will make the decision. The VRC and the Supreme Court of
Virginia could reach very different conclusions regarding how to
start the redistricting process, and for sensible reasons. For example, a preference for starting anew could be tempered with a recognition of the importance of seniority in the U.S House of Representatives. If power comes from seniority and having long-serving
congressmen is important to Virginia, deciding to use the current
districts as a baseline—which might be less likely to radically
change a district—might be a reasonable or preferred way to start
the process. That might resonate differently with different mapmakers.
Second, the General Assembly has not indicated what kind of
districts the Commonwealth should prefer. A set of safe and stable
districts might produce different policy outcomes, for good or for ill,
than would a set of competitive districts. The General Assembly
may have thought this question one they should not or could not
answer, but they should answer it. The question affects politics,
but it is not a partisan question. The General Assembly has already embedded some of its preferences in the legislation; it arguably should provide some guidance here as well. This is an important policy question that likely will be answered by the next
mapmaker, but arguably should not be answered by VRC or the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
Third, the General Assembly has not explained why it should no
longer be primarily responsible for redistricting. No explanation is
necessary for why it should not redistrict in 2021 the way it redistricted in 2011 and 2012. However, if the General Assembly believes it performed its job poorly in 2011 and 2012, it should fix the

305. Acts of Apr. 22, 2020, chs. 1229 & 1265, 2020 Va. Acts at __, __ & __, __ (codified at
VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-304.04(5) (Cum. Supp. 2020)).
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problems and do a better job in 2021. Ironically, the new redistricting criteria may be a step in the right direction. If the new redistricting principles are the right redistricting principles, the General Assembly should apply them and redistrict. If the criteria are
not the right ones or are not complete, how the VRC or the Supreme Court of Virginia will fix them while applying them is not
clear.
CONCLUSION
In its 2020 session, the General Assembly considered how redistricting in 2021 should proceed in a legal landscape much different
from the one that existed in 2011. The General Assembly enacted
new districting criteria and pushed forward a constitutional
amendment creating the Virginia Redistricting Commission. The
General Assembly’s 2020 approach to 2021 redistricting was remarkable. It enshrined its policy preferences in Virginia law with
the newly enacted redistricting criteria but encouraged those policy preferences be enforced, and other policy choices be made, by
other entities—the VRC and possibly the Supreme Court of Virginia—through the constitutional amendment. The amendment’s
passage has fundamentally altered the redistricting process. The
General Assembly will not draw district lines, though it may still
be deemed responsible for districts that are created. If all goes well,
the VRC will draw maps that reflect the General Assembly’s policy
choices underlying the newly enacted redistricting criteria, and the
General Assembly will approve them. If all does not go well, the
Supreme Court of Virginia will make policy choices reflected in its
redistricting maps and the General Assembly will have nothing to
say about it. Allowing the court to use new redistricting criteria to
draw electoral districts for the legislature—and likely make big
electoral policy choices in the process if only by default—seems odd
because it is odd.
The post-2020 census redistricting process will be different than
the post-2010 census redistricting process, and that might be a
good thing. The results may not differ much from a standard redistricting process, in which case the General Assembly’s actions in
its 2020 session may have been so much sound and fury. Conversely, the results may be significantly different, in which case we
should fasten our seatbelts for a wild ride.

